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Abstract. Continuous risk monitoring is considered in the context of
cybersecurity management for the Industrial Internet-of-Thing. Cyber-
risk management best practice is for security controls to be deployed and
configured in order to bring down risk exposure to an acceptable level.
However, threats and known vulnerabilities are subject to change, and
estimates of risk are subject to many uncertainties, so it is important
to review risk assessments and update controls when required. Risks are
typically reviewed periodically (e.g. once per month), but the acceler-
ating pace of change means that this approach is not sustainable, and
there is a requirement for continuous monitoring of cybersecurity risks.
The method described in this paper aims to alert security staff of signif-
icant changes or trends in estimated risk exposure to facilitate rational
and timely decisions. Additionally, it helps predict the success and im-
pact of a nascent security breach allowing better prioritisation of threats
and selection of appropriate responses. The method is illustrated using
a scenario based on environmental control in a data centre.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Industrial IoT, Industrial Control Sys-
tems, Cyber-security, Control Systems, Risk Analysis
1 Introduction
The US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) defines risk
monitoring as “maintaining ongoing awareness of an organisations risk envi-
ronment, risk management program, and associated activities to support risk
decisions”[6]. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for risk monitoring to be done as a
discrete activity, once over a period of one, or even several, months with a low
level of integration with the operational processes.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) present important concerns regard-
ing cyber security including risks where consequences go beyond the realm of
information systems to interact with the physical world. Therefore, it is advan-
tageous to have timely information about the possible development of a threat
scenario.
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can overload Security Operations Centre (SOC) personnel with data. Introduc-
ing a risk-based approach to automated threat detection would allow prioritising
security resources and improve decision making. Many methods fail to do this
by focusing only on the threat and on the direct consequences, detaching the
analysis from the operational impacts, and from the business context. The so-
lution proposed in this research contributes to improving IoT cyber security by
monitoring risks continuously. The main idea is to provide a holistic view of the
potential impacts of an attack considering how the consequences at an opera-
tional level can affect business processes and strategic objectives. The aim of
developing this method is to provide relevant, accurate and timely information
about cyber-security risks in IoT systems.
While the focus of the method is to adjust risk indicators in near real time,
it is necessary to have a good level of understanding about the variables that
will be used in the calculations.
The method considers a variety of inputs divided in two groups: dynamic
and static. Dynamic inputs will provide 9near) real time information about the
state of the system to a risk calculation engine that will update the key risk
indicators. This should shorten response times for allocation and adjustment of
security controls. Continuous updates to the risk treatment plan will procure a
better integration between operational processes, risk management, and security
processes.
As one of the main “blind-spots” in IoT security is the physical layer, it is
proposed to use anomaly detection techniques to monitor variables that can be
correlated with possible security issues. Examples are electricity consumption,
server performance, and other side-channel information. Establishing direct cor-
relations between an anomaly and its root cause will be challenging and in many
cases it will require the involvement of an expert. Also, it may be more difficult
to obtain these data compared with other dynamic inputs such as software and
network monitoring, because not all of them will be necessarily provided by al-
ready available detection tools. Addressing this is among the main challenges
that this research project will face.
At the current stage of this research, a conceptual model has been developed
with the potential to be adapted to different sorts of IoT systems. Section 2 of
this paper explains the problem and current gaps that are addressed. Section 3
gives an example of a use case to provide a setting for explaining the method.
Section 4 gives a the general description of the method. Section 5 provides a
threat scenario based on the case described in Section 3 and explains how the
method would work in this case. Section 6 mentions relevant considerations and
future challenges of this project and Section 7 provides the conclusions.
2 Outline of the problem
Although there are many expectations about introducing new technologies in the
industrial industrial control system domain there are also many legacy systems
3that cannot be easily replaced. These systems are still widely used and deployed
and will need to coexist with the concept of Industry 4.0. One important concern
is that their original design did not consider security sufficiently for the current
levels of connectivity. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is closely related to IoT
in the sense that they both fit within the definition of an ”ecosystem of inter-
connected devices and services that exchange and process data” [9]. Throughout
this paper, the term IoT will be used under the understanding that Industrial
Control Systems fit among this definition. Some authors will refer to these sys-
tems as Industrial IoT (IIoT). Examples of use cases in IoT can be found but
are not restricted to the following industries[21]:
– Transportation
– Health-care
– Government
– Public safety and military
– Retail and hospitality
– Food and farming
– Manufacturing and heavy industry
– Entertainment and sports
– Energy and utilities
– Finance and banking
– Education
– Information and communications technology
In most of these industries, performance, time to market and cost pressures
have been a priority over cyber-security [21]. The lack of standards and regula-
tions, and poor security awareness of manufacturers and users has not helped
to improve this situation. In the past (and in some cases, still in the present)
electro-mechanical or cyber-physical systems based their security mostly on iso-
lation and perimeter security. The circumstances have changed and the vulnera-
bility of these systems has increased. Even critical systems that are isolated from
public networks present risks. For example, the malware Stuxnet, discovered in
2010, was allegedly infiltrated to an Iranian nuclear plant through an USB drive
connected to one of the computer terminals. This terminal was connected to the
control system and was used as foothold to spread the malware to the Siemens
PLCs of the plant. This is an example of the “air gap myth” which proves that
isolation by itself is insufficient.
Although attacks on IoT systems are nothing new, the amount of connected
IoT systems currently exceeds the human population [10][14], giving more op-
portunities to attackers. An industrial report released this year based on the
study of different attack vectors in industries reveals that in 82% of the cases an
internal attacker could have penetrated the industrial system from the corporate
network. Significant flaws in network segmentation and separation of privilege
were also found, among many other vulnerabilities [25]. Attacks on Symantec’s
IoT honeypots almost doubled in less than a year [29]. According to Cisco, no
industry vertical is safe from cyber-attacks [3] and it is believed that IoT devices
4“are becoming the attack infrastructure of the future” [1]. Cyber-crime has be-
come to be known as a profitable business and cyber-weapons also have started
to be commonly used by nations for surveillance and national intelligence. smart
TV’s have already been known to be part of plans to develop tools for espi-
onage, and successful cases of sabotage of national critical infrastructure have
been attributed to nation states.
Because IoT systems are based, in part, on computer and network systems,
they inherits all their security issues, as well as presenting additional cyber-risks.
Their complex architecture increases their attack-surface [16] [21] by the addi-
tion of devices that interact with the physical world. The variety of hardware
involved will have distinctive requirements and constraints which makes security
more challenging. In many cases, typical security mechanisms could be not fea-
sible or be insufficient [26]. Limitations in memory and processing capabilities,
as well as real time response requirements present constraints to encryption and
authentication processes. Also, special attention regarding physical security is
required as often the systems have components distributed in a wide area. The
use of wireless communications has an inherent risk enhanced by the variety
of protocols and enabling technologies. There are fewer standards, regulations,
and overall less experience in IoT security [21] and manufacturers tend to have
less knowledge in the matter than professionals from the software development
world [4]. Whereas in information systems the main concern usually is related to
confidentiality, in IoT systems implications of a cyber attack go beyond informa-
tion theft. Risks can include also damage of physical assets, and even threat to
human life [26]. For example by compromising the integrity or availability of crit-
ical systems such as life support equipment or systems working in safety-critical
environments.
Currently, an important amount of available literature proposes solutions for
particular aspects of IoT security such as authentication, secure communica-
tions, and attack modelling. These solutions are relevant, but not sufficient by
themselves to provide acceptable levels of security. Security issues of one layer
of an IoT system cannot be solved in another [16]. This means that different
solutions need to be integrated and effectiveness monitored in the context of the
overall system.
Security should be implemented as a combination of processes, technology,
and people [6] so it is important to consider all these factors in the equation.
Automated tools can help to deal with big data and recognise patterns of be-
haviour, but these patterns need to be put in the context of the operational
and business processes and their objectives. The input of experts is essential to
achieve this.
Several methods have been developed for IoT cyber security risk assessments
based on existing techniques, including game theory [28], fuzzy logic [17], and
Bayesian Networks [31]. Some of these methods are general and others focus on
specific type of system. A review of 24 existing cyber security risk assessment
methods applied for SCADA systems was done in [2] where the main opportu-
nities of improvement that were found are the following:
51. Addressing context establishment
2. Overcoming attack or failure orientation 1
3. Accounting for the human factor
4. Capture and formalisation of expert opinion
5. Improvement of the reliability of probabilistic data
6. Evaluation and validation
7. Tool support
Risk analysis continues to be understood as a discrete activity, often done
using spreadsheets or other tools which are not integrated with operations and
are fed manually with data. Nevertheless, the NIST recommends transitioning
to near real time risk management [7]. With new threats and vulnerabilities
been discovered on a regular basis, it is likely that many of the data used in
a risk assessment would expire in a short period of time. This would make the
results irrelevant. Very little academic work has been done related to real time
or continuous risk evaluation.
A limited amount of research proposing dynamic or real time cyber security
risk evaluation methods has been published [12] [13] but most of them are not
specific for IoT or IIoT. Other models for real time risk assessment reviewed
were mainly focused on threat and anomaly detection and did not consider the
impacts. Anomaly detection can be useful to detect threats in an IoT system
by comparing variables with a model of their expected behaviour. However, the
picture will be incomplete if this information is detached from its context. Several
publications about anomaly detection in IoT, Industrial Control, and SCADA
systems propose techniques such as machine learning [11][20][17], data mining
[24], statistical analysis [8][32], and hybrid methods [19]. The work published by
Zhang et al [33] on incident prediction and risk assessment for industrial control
systems considers both real time processing and asset valuation, but, it only
provides proof of concept through simulation experiments on a single type of
system. In conclusion, there is a lack of risk assessment methods for IoT that
are both holistic and dynamic and that have been tested in different scenarios.
3 Example of a risk scenario in IoT system
A simplified temperature control system will be used to illustrate the method.
Temperature control is use case that can be found in domestic, commercial,
and industrial environments. Nevertheless, in different domains the system will
typically present different characteristics, types of technology, and architectures.
This research, rather than in IoT domestic or consumer devices, is focused on In-
dustrial Systems. Temperature control can have different purposes in industries.
For example, avoiding products such as food and chemicals to decompose or
degrade, or allowing different process to perform in optimal conditions. A tem-
perature control malfunction will have different consequences depending on the
1 This means basing the analysis only on known attack mechanisms and failure modes
6business processes involved. Understanding these consequences is crucial when
assessing risks, and also a key part of finding possible signals of compromise.
The scenario developed in this example corresponds to the temperature con-
trol system for a Data Centre, and is shown in Figure 1. The scenario was
validated with an engineer that works in a consultancy in Chile who has over
ten years of work experience in configuration, installation, and maintenance of
Industrial Control Systems.
A data centre, ideally should operate in an environment with a temperature
between 24 and 27 degrees Celsius [23]. This includes a margin of error, as servers
typically can tolerate up to 30C. At higher temperatures, servers do not achieve
their best performance, and their fans will need to spin at their maximum rate,
increasing power consumption. To avoid the temperature surpassing an estab-
lished limit, Direct Digital Control (DDC) devices are used which are connected
directly to temperature sensors and to the control valves for the heating and
cooling systems. The controllers communicate with a Building Management Sys-
tem (BMS) that runs in an application server. A local PC located in the same
premises is in charge to run the control and monitoring software interface. The
BMS sends alerts via email and SMS messages when an event requires attention.
Fig. 1. Diagram of Temperature Control System
Figure 2 shows a diagram from the Industrial Internet Reference Architec-
ture (IIRA) [18] that will be used to describe the system based on the definition
of three tiers. The edge tier collects data from the real world through the prox-
imity network where sensors and actuators are connected. The platform tier
exchanges, consolidates, and processes data from the other tiers. This can in-
clude commands generated in the enterprise tier to control variables in the edge
tier. The enterprise tier implements domain-specific applications and provides
user interfaces.
7Fig. 2. Three tier architecture pattern from the IIRA Implementation Viewpoint
The following specification represents the system “as is”, before applying any
risk treatment:
Edge Tier: comprises sensors, actuators and DDCs. The sensors and actua-
tors are hard wired to the controllers providing inherent trust. They use electrical
signals to communicate. Thus, they are not “smart”. The DDCs have a keyboard
allowing authentication through a 4 digit security code. In the perimeter net-
work, the protocol used by the controllers is Modbus (other protocols commonly
used in these systems are Bacnet and Lonworks). The controllers are connected
to a gateway that converts the signals to a standard internet protocol (TCP/IP)
and connects to a Local Area Network (LAN).
Platform Tier: comprises the BMS software installed in an application
server that processes operational data. The access network which connects the
Platform tier to the Edge Tier is the same as the service network, corresponding
to the LAN. The system is insulated from other networks for security reasons,
except for the connection to an email server that allows sending alerts to oper-
ators in case of certain events and the connection to a service that sends SMS
alerts. There are no firewalls or any network monitoring and detection mecha-
nisms in place. The network server has separate cards for the LAN and other
networks.
Enterprise Tier: comprises a monitoring and control software running in
a PC terminal. Authentication is done through user and password without en-
forcing a secure credentials. There are no defences against brute force attacks
in place. Privilege separation options include user, administrator and engineer
roles. There is no remote connection, therefore the software only can be accessed
within the perimeter. Remote monitoring is based only on the alerts sent by the
BMS system.
Physical Security: authorised personnel is authenticated through an ID
card, a 4 digit password, and their digital print. Special authorisation is required
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accompanied by an authorised member of staff at all times, some contractors
might be left alone for small periods of time, as sometimes they require to work
there for several hours. The hardware of the control systems has often physical
ports open. Personnel only visit the data centre when it is necessary, but there
is nobody permanently in the area.
Cyber-security policies and practices: before the risk assessment, the
BMS was considered in the cyber-security policies of the data centre. Some iso-
lated cyber-security controls were in place, such as some degree of authentication,
and the control for physical access described. There is not a clear differentiation
of roles and privileges and most users just share credentials. This includes con-
tractors. Network security is based only on isolation, and for this reason malware
detection is not considered important. At the enterprise platform level the soft-
ware registers and stores event logs but they are not monitored. Regarding the
configuration of the temperature control settings, there is no registration of any
changes or events and there are no configuration management policies in place.
Backups of the system are done every six months, but there are no assurance
processes to audit this or any other cyber-security practice.
4 Description of the method proposed
This project aims to make use of different sources of data to analyse cyber-risks
in a continuous basis, integrating this activity with the operational process. The
objective of the method is to generate useful and meaningful information for
decision makers. A “decision maker” is any actor that is in position to make
a decision that can affect security. These decisions can be related to business
operations that can cause collateral effects in security or to security management
itself. Figure 3 shows a general view of the method. The Security Operations
Centre (SOC) which is the area that monitors and deals with security issues
on an organisation will be provided with a more comprehensive view of attack
vectors, by including IoT and operation technologies (industrial systems) in their
scope. They will also be able to establish priorities for alerts regarding to the level
of risk involved. The risk analysts will be allowed to monitor risks continuously,
evaluating the effectiveness of security measures and control, and providing up-
to-date inputs to decision making processes that involve or affect security.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the method
9While the whole purpose of risk management is to improve decision making,
the landscape changes too quickly to have a picture of the situation without
expecting it to vary in a short time. Different internal and external factors, will
continuously shape the degree of risk. New information can modify the levels
of uncertainty regarding occurrence of an event, and also internal and external
changes can affect risks factors. This means that security plans based on previous
evaluations may become quickly obsolete. In the case of IoT and IIoT, there
are more attack vectors and less visibility of the system from end-to-end in
comparison with IT systems. Thus, analysing, monitoring and managing risks is
critical.
Figure 4 shows a conceptual model describing the main building blocks of
the method proposed. The idea is that the results should generate decisions that
affect the risk treatment plan of the organisation, modifying the situation of the
security levels of the IIoT system. The inputs for the risk calculations will come
from three main sources: detection tools, systems variables, and a knowledge
base. The first two type of sources are categorised as dynamic inputs and would
be transmitted in a continuous stream. The data that is stored in the knowledge
base is categorised as static inputs which either remains unchanged or is subject
to eventual updates. The risk calculation engine will process the information
about threats, vulnerabilities and impacts and issue alerts in the event of any
condition that might change the risk scores.
Fig. 4. Building blocks of the method
4.1 Dynamic inputs
These inputs are captured in run time from tools for malware detection, intrusion
detection, network traffic analysis, and logs monitoring, and threat intelligence
sharing. An anomaly detection tool is in charge of analysing data that can reveal
signs of threats, including operational data. A module based on a SIEM software
will be used to process the dynamic inputs that will feed the risk calculation
engine. The anomaly detection tool will help detecting issues related to the edge
tier.
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Currently, there are existent commercial tools for anomaly detection based on
machine learning. While normal operation conditions of the system and business
rules could, in theory, eventually be learned by artificial intelligence (AI), this
will need a training period and stable conditions over time. Therefore, known
business rules and thresholds should be previously set. Also it is necessary to
include expert’s knowledge regarding other variables like dependencies between
processes, impacts at different levels, regulations and strategic decisions. There-
fore, while machine learning and AI techniques will contribute to anomaly de-
tection, it is proposed to combine it with other methods. It is not aimed in
this project to work with tools that work following a 100% unsupervised dy-
namic. The human factor and experts knowledge are elements that require to be
acknowledged in risk management [2].
4.2 Static inputs
Static inputs correspond to the data that cannot be collected online. The reasons
could be that there are no tools available to collect this information on real time
or, that the data just does not change continuously. For example, the valuation
of an asset, quantification of impacts, and risk acceptance criteria. These inputs
will be provided during the set up process of the tool. The data will be stored in
a knowledge base and updated in a periodic basis or after events. An example of
such events is a change in the risk appetite of the organisation. The provenance
of this data will be diverse, some inputs will be loaded from tools or data bases
and others manually. Examples of inputs stored in the knowledge base are: asset
inventory, asset and impact valuation, initial threat quantification, traceability
between threats and assets, and between processes and business objectives, and
definition of normal and abnormal states of operation.
4.3 Risk Calculation Engine
The risk calculation engine would be in charge to process the inputs and gen-
erate the results. This engine will be implemented in a software tool. The risk
calculation engine would be based on different standards to quantify vulnerabili-
ties, threats, and impacts, the three variables that define a cyber-risk. The FAIR
method (Factor analysis of information Risks) [30] is a useful start point to un-
derstand the different factors that are involved in a cyber-risk. This method de-
fines the vulnerability as a combination of the “threat capability”, the resource-
fulness of the threat agents to act against an asset, and the “control strengths”,
the probability that the current controls resist the attack. While this definition
is conceptually useful, the quantification of these two factors, as defined by this
method can present problems. Both are defined according to their position within
a probabilistic distribution of the threat population, meaning that it is necessary
to be able to make plausible assumptions about the possible threat agents. The
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [5], provides a score from zero
to ten depending on eight variables which are related to the vulnerability. These
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variables are: attack vector, attack complexity, privileges required, user inter-
action, scope, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Additionally, temporal
and environmental metrics help giving a score are used for more accuracy within
an specific context.
Different methods were reviewed for quantification of threats. Some methods
base the probability of a threat event in the frequency of occurrence [30][15]. This
approach can be plausible in environments that maintain similar conditions over
time. Nevertheless, in cyber-security assuming that threats will behave in the
future following the same trend they have done in the past is dangerous. It has
to be considered that often new attack mechanisms and zero-day vulnerabilities
appear. The model proposed by SANDIA [22] analyses and scores threats by
building a profile according to seven different attributes: intensity, stealth, time,
technical personnel, cyber-knowledge, kinetic knowledge, and access. Different
combinations of this attributes are used to describe 8 different threat profiles,
where 1 represents the highest level of threat and 8 the lowest.
To calculate the impact, it is common transforming every consequence into
monetary values, because it is an useful way to add up and compare impacts
of diverse nature, such as time loss and reputation damage, among others. As
a mean of normalising this value, it will be suggested within this method to
use a ratio between the total impact of a risk and a referential budget that the
organisation will define according to its risk appetite.
The quantification of risks done in the initial assessment would be subject to
continuous updates during operation mode. This updates will be related to the
threat analysis, which is the factor that presents the higher levels of uncertainty.
The threat value then, is the risk component that will be subject to change dy-
namically according to the information provided by the dynamic inputs. When
events that imply possible threats are detected, they will have an effect of mod-
ifying the quantification of the corresponding threat values, and therefore, the
risk scores.
4.4 Results
Continuous re-calculations of Key Risk Indicators (KRI) will be performed in
run time for monitoring purposes, and stored in a data base for ex-post anal-
ysis. The risk analyst and SOC operator will have different views of the KRI
according to their roles. The risk analyst will be more interested in monitoring
the behaviour of the risks and evaluating the effectiveness of current controls, as
a mean to make better informed security-related decisions. The SOC operator
will be more focused on alerts and any indicator of an attack developing in any
of its stages. This is explained through an example in section 5. Risks are based
on uncertainty. Thus, in the cases of an imminent attack, this is not considered a
risk but an issue. In most occasions a cyber-attack will not take place in a single
instance but it will follow a sequence of stages. Detection of an issue such as an
unauthorised access or malware presence, can help to avoid the risk of an attack
progressing into further stages, like privilege escalation, maintaining foothold,
and establishing command and control capabilities.
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4.5 Initial risk assessment and continuous monitoring dynamic
The method will consider two stages: the initial risk assessment and the continu-
ous risk assessment. In the first stage the initial KRI are calculated and the risk
monitoring tool is configured according to the context. This activity will con-
dition the success of the continuous risk assessment. Therefore, it is crucial to
develop a good understanding of the likelihood and impacts of a breach. Different
forms and questionnaires based on standards (e.g. ISO 27005) will be developed
to capture expert’s opinion and guide the set-up process of the tool in a way
that cyber risks can be mapped with their impacts at all levels of the organi-
sation, including the business point of view. The second stage is the continuous
risk assessment which consists in the recalculation of risk scores according to the
information provided by the detection tools.
5 Demonstration of the method through the example
To demonstrate how the continuous risk assessment method would work, a threat
scenario was built using the example of section 3. The initial risk assessment
and tool configuration stage will consist in evaluating the system “as is”. After
this, a risk treatment plan is developed, incorporating controls to mitigate risks
and residual risks are formally accepted. Then, the continuous risk assessment
process starts.
5.1 Initial risk assessment and tool configuration.
In this stage risks are identified, quantified and evaluated. It is expected that
after this assessment a risk treatment plan will be developed, incorporating con-
trols. The next stage will provide the means to monitor the effectiveness of these
measures in a continuous basis. The risk management approach will follow the
process described by the ISO27005 standard shown in figure 5.
Context establishment. In this stage it is defined the scope, including as-
sets that need protection. To illustrate the method some of the attack vectors
related to the temperature control system will be reviewed. The assets considered
in the assessment belong to both the data centre domain and the company busi-
ness domain, because the temperature control system can be used as a bridge to
other systems. Other control systems in the data centre such as CCTV, fire alarm
system, electrical supply and UPS, as well as servers and network equipment are
included in the monitoring. Their dependencies with the temperature control
system need to be established at this point. Operational and business processes,
as well as support processes such as IT, finance, and human resources should
be considered. To quantify impacts, a series of possible consequences were listed
including damages to assets implying replacement or reparation, effort spent in
recovery, downtime, fines, and compensations to customers and third parties,
and damage in brand reputation. This last can be reflected in loss of revenue or
need to expend in marketing strategies to recover the trust of the customers. All
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Fig. 5. Overview of the risk management process, ISO27005
the impacts are quantified in monetary values. To put this value in context ac-
cording to its significance to the organisation, an impact indicator is calculated
to evaluate the impact in terms of the monthly budget that the company assigns
for cybersecurity.
The risk acceptance criteria is established to define a risk frontier depending
on the organisations risk appetite. Once established this frontier, any risk that is
out of limits is reviewed and included in the risk treatment plan. The decision of
retaining any risk outside of these limits needs to be formally approved by senior
management. We will suppose this company defined that any risk that is rated
medium or higher or whose potential impact exceeds a predefined value should
be reviewed. The roles involved in this risk assessment were: risk analyst, GRC
manager, SOC analyst, Security manager, data centre manager and operators,
the asset owners of all assets identified in the assessment, and senior management
(CSO, CIO, CEO).
Risk assessment. In this stage, risks are identified, analysed, and evalu-
ated. The analysis process consist in understanding possible attack paths, and
consequences of a breach, and making plausible assumptions that allow iden-
tifying and quantifying threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impacts. Threats
and vulnerabilities are linked with possible assets compromised and impacts at
different levels. The likelihood is estimated based on the threat and vulnera-
bility levels, and the total impact is quantified considering the effects on the
operational processes as well as in the business.
From the analysis of the system “as is”, it was found possible that internal
personnel or a contractor could download malicious code in the computer ter-
minal using a USB drive. Thus, bridging the air-gap. The motivations of the
attacker which could be many, for example, been bribed by a competitor to
sabotage the servers. The malicious code could have different purposes, which
means that there are different risks. The present example will focus on two risks:
Risk 1 will correspond to the manipulation of the temperature to increase failure
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rates of the servers and Risk 2 is related to the use of the BMS as a bridge to
access the business networks. Each of the two risks is analysed independently.
Risk 1 was analysed obtaining a low level of vulnerability and a low level
of threat. The impact was also considered low, since the system could be easily
reset and reconfigured in the case of been compromised. As a result, this risk
was rated as low. Risk 2 was rated as medium, because, although the threat
and vulnerability were also considered low, the impact was considered high as
critical processes and data could be compromised. Both risks were evaluated by
comparing them with the risk acceptance criteria (risk frontier) concluding that
only Risk 2 needed to be included in the risk treatment plan.
Risk treatment. After the risk assessment, a risk treatment plan is devel-
oped, to address all the risks that exceeded the risk frontier choosing from a
set of three possible actions: reduce, avoid, or share. A fourth possible action is
retaining the risk, which can be consider under senior management approval. In
the case of Risk 2, using the BMS to access other networks, it was decided to
reduce the risk by introducing an firewall in the local network.
Tool configuration. Residual risks are analysed and evaluated after the
risk treatment plan is put in action. The information is loaded in the knowledge
base, including the scores of all the risks identified. As Risk 2 was reduced, it is
re-evaluated and defined as low which means that it is within acceptable limits.
At this point, all the risk scores should be below the risk frontier. There could
be two reasons why some risks might not meet this condition. One is that the
control defined in the risk treatment plan has not been fully implemented yet,
and the other is that there is a formal authorisation of senior management to
retain certain risk. Each risk is linked with the events that might change the
current scores in order to start the continuous monitoring process.
5.2 Continuous risk assessment.
In the previous stage, an initial iteration of the information security risk man-
agement process was done. The following step consists in monitoring the risks
and perform subsequent iterations of the whole process. Through the continuous
risk assessment, it is intended that these iterations will be repeated in short in-
tervals of time and whenever a certain development of events requires it, rather
than in a periodic basis.
For the current example, we will imagine that a contractor introduces mali-
cious code through an USB drive in the computer terminal to change the tem-
perature control settings. The malware will work in a similar way as Stuxnet,
changing temperature setting of the DDCs and disguising this action by dis-
playing the original set values of temperature. Therefore, there will not be any
condition that triggers an alert directly related to overheating. For example, the
set value is 25 degrees Celsius, and all the instances of the system display 25
degrees, but the temperature will really be 50 degrees Celsius. The malicious
actions are scheduled to take place at hours where is more unlikely to be staff
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on site to notice this, allowing persistence of the attack and increasing the po-
tential damage. But, while the malware might remain unnoticed, the anomaly
detection system will detect an unusual behaviour in other processes which are
linked to this. The fans of the servers will spin faster, increasing the electrical
power consumption and the servers might not perform in their best capacity.
Considerable outliers in the energy consumption levels and in the performance
of the servers will trigger an alert by the anomaly detection system. The risk
calculation engine will process this information and modify the risk indicators
of all the risks that can be related to this event, including Risk 1. An alert will
be sent to the SOC operator to investigate the situation and call for action. In
parallel, another alert will be sent to the risk analyst indicating that Risk 1 has
now been rated as high. The risk analyst will also have the information about
the processes that the affected servers are running and how they impact the
business.
The previous example shows how a risk that was initially considered low
changes to a higher value dynamically, through the development of events. The
threat score is amplified when suspicious events are detected resulting in a higher
risk value. It has to be noticed that this would lead to two courses of action. First,
the SOC operator can generate an immediate response regarding remediation
and recovery actions. Second, the risk analyst will generate all the necessary
actions to develop a risk treatment plan to establish controls to avoid this risk
becoming again an issue in the future. Examples of these actions are blocking all
unused physical ports by default, restricting the privileges to download software,
and adding malware detection and stricter regulations regarding not leaving any
third party unattended in the perimeter.
6 Considerations and challenges
The development of this method will not be exempt of challenges. There are still
unsolved issues in this project which need to be tackled in future stages of this
project for the method and tool to have a practical application.
Because IoT and IIoT systems are very heterogeneous, the method only can
be tested in a limited amount of systems. Tailoring guidelines can be provided
for adapting the method to different use cases, and it would be a matter of
further research to confirm its applicability in different contexts and scenarios.
Big data issues including processing, storage and retrieval of information will
also be a challenge, as well as the development of interfaces between tools and
normalisation of the data.
As much as there might be a lot of ground in common with regular IT
systems, this project aims to tackle the particular requirements of IIoT. One of
the challenges of this is that the amount of processes, stakeholders, dependencies
with other systems, and assets involved is bigger. Also, there might be more
expectation for these systems to have automated security controls. Nevertheless,
it must be recognised that the autonomy of any system will always be within
certain limits. Establishing these limits, mapping all the processes affected, as
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well as providing appropriate rules and training mechanisms to the anomaly
detection system is part of the challenge.
False positives is a known problem of detection tools which would affect, as
well this method. It is necessary to find solutions that do not undermine the
ability of the method to alert when there is a real threat. The user will has
the mission of calibrating the tool by identifying and giving feedback about any
misinterpretation of the data. A case management system would be a possible
alternative to support a continuous improvement mechanism for the method.
Overall, it is important to understand the data in order to avoid providing
misleading results. An example of this is the huge amount of noise that failed
attack attempts can cause which may lead to think that there is a developing
threat when actually according to [22] one attribute that increases the threat is,
precisely, stealth. Attacks that are easy to detect and stop might not be a threat
at all!
Another aspect is to distinguish cyber-attacks from other issues such as phys-
ical attacks or malfunctions of the system. It is considered on the best interest of
an organisation to know about any potential threat even if it is not caused by a
cyber-attack. Therefore, the detection of an issue whose causes end to be from a
different nature, rather than been dismissed, should be reported to the relevant
stakeholders. Although the scope of the method is to monitor cyber-risks, from
the risk management point of view, other types of risk can also be of interest.
For example, in [27] it is argued that physical attacks and cyber-attacks should
not be treated separately proposing 4 types of attacks: physical-only, cyber only,
cyber-enabled physical and physical-enabled cyber.
7 Conclusions
The presence of IoT in several industries and the increasing amount of cyber
threats predicts a growth in the demand for cyber security solutions. Developing
methods to maintain cyber-situational awareness through a continuous risk mon-
itoring process can support rational and well informed decisions. The approach
proposed takes into account the context of the system, as well as the business
objectives and priorities. By linking the potential threats with the impacts and
vulnerabilities it is possible to do a better prioritisation of security resources.
Shorter iterations for risk assessments will make it possible to react in a more
timely manner to changes in the environment. The underlying principle is that
risk management should not be detached from the system’s operations, it should
be integrated, since both processes serve as input to each other.
Currently there are not widely used and tested solutions to evaluate IIoT
cyber security risks in run time that include an holistic perspective of the system.
The present paper gives a general description of a solution that has the potential
of addressing several gaps of existent risk assessment approaches. Considering
the context establishment and capturing expert’s opinion is addressed on the
initial assessment and tool configuration, and subject to updates. The feedback
loop of the system requires experts to be involved in the process as well as to give
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input to calibrate the method. The method also goes beyond attack or failure
orientation because it is not limited to known attack mechanisms. By including
anomaly detection and other tools it allows issuing alerts under any event that
diverts the system’s behaviour from what is consider normal. This is relevant,
because it is not feasible to analyse all the possible attack mechanisms. The
combination of different tools to support this method, as well as the development
of the risk calculation engine as an automated tool, will allow the method to be
implemented in a practical and effective way. If decision makers are well informed
of cyber-security risks, this will allow better application of policies and control
mechanisms, improving the overall security of the system.
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